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Abstract:   
This article starts with discussing principles for a globally just system of refugee protection to 
which states contribute either by admitting refugees for resettlement or by supporting refugee 
integration in other states. Such a system requires relatively strong assurances of compliance 
by the states involved, which are absent in the international arena. In the European Union, 
however, the Member States form a predetermined set with prior commitments and 
supranational institutions that facilitate effective burden sharing. The article traces the failure 
of the EU’s relocation scheme to meet this expectation to misconceptions how to determine 
fair shares, to incomplete prior harmonization of normative standards, and to contradictions 
between the Dublin Regulation’s principle of assigning responsibility to first countries of entry, 
on the one hand, and the Schengen principle of open internal borders, on the other hand. 
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1. Introduction 
It has often been pointed out that the European refugee crisis is also a crisis of European 
integration. This paper tries to explain why and proposes a normative argument for a 
Europeanization of refugee protection. I argue that in addition to their general duties to admit 
refugees, EU member states have special duties towards each other that include sincere 
cooperation and a commitment to keep internal borders open. These three duties hang 
together in such a way that the failure of the member states to accept their general duties of 
refugee admission have triggered a severe crisis of European integration through the building of 
fences and sustained controls at internal borders as well as a more general decline of 
cooperation between member states.  
The paper begins with a discussion of state duties to admit refugees based on recent political 
theory literature on the topic (section 2). I argue that a just refugee protection system must aim 
to maximize the number of refugees who will receive effective protection. This entails 
accepting other criteria for refugee distribution apart from wealth and size of states, including 
an option for states to choose between relocation of refugees to their territory and financial 
support for refugee integration in other states. A just system of refugee protection requires, 
however, relatively strong assurances of compliance by the states involved, which are absent in 
the international arena. Even if most states fail to comply, the remaining states nevertheless 
retain moral duties to cooperate in a burden-sharing scheme as long as none of them would 
face overwhelming burdens in such a cooperation.   
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In section 3 I argue that the European Union offers the best conditions that can be assumed 
under real world circumstances for an effective regional refugee protection regime. I locate the 
reason why this potential has not been realized in institutional failures to Europeanize refugee 
policies. This would have required abandoning the Dublin Regulation’s assignment of full 
responsibility for asylum seekers to the first EU country of entry and replacing it with a 
European system of asylum registration, determination and relocation of asylum seekers. Given 
the failure of EU institutions and leaders to Europeanize asylum and refugee policies in time, 
they face now a populist backlash against refugee admission as well as European integration.  
For the sake of brevity, I will not consider several characteristic features of the European 
refugee crisis (Triandafyllidou and Mantanika 2017): the sudden surge in numbers in 2015; the 
mixed composition of flows in terms of multiple origins and the mixed motives of asylum 
seekers to escape from violence but also to improve their economic opportunities; the 
involvement of people smugglers and traffickers that was driven not only by a surge in demand, 
but also by the closure of previously accessible migration channels; the EU relations with 
European Neighbourhood states and – in the case of Turkey – accession candidates that used 
their position as transit countries of refugee flows to bargain for concessions in return for 
preventing departures or accepting returns. I will also not discuss the role that third countries 
ought to play in a burden-sharing scheme for refugee relocation within a union of states 
(Gerver 2013). While these features need to be considered when explaining and evaluating 
comprehensively the EU failure in the refugee crisis, I do not think that any of them diminishes 
the moral duties and the institutional capacities of the EU and its member states to cooperate 
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in a burden-sharing scheme whose goal is to provide effective protection to as many refugees 
as possible. 
2. States’ legitimacy and duties towards refugees 
Political theorists generally agree that the citizens whose states provide them with security, 
liberty and a decent level of social welfare have moral duties towards those more unfortunate 
people who enjoy none of these benefits and are forced to leave their country in order to seek 
protection from persecution, violence and threats to their basic human needs. It seems natural 
to think about these moral duties as humanitarian ones that are similar to our duties to assist 
and rescue strangers in distress. Such duties fall upon anyone who encounters a stranger whose 
life is in jeopardy and they are limited in terms of costs and time. We are not obliged to help if 
this comes at a risk to our own lives and we are not obliged to permanently support strangers 
whom we have rescued, let alone to invite them to share our homes. Proponents of a 
humanitarian argument for refugee admission believe that states will be readier to accept the 
corresponding duties if these are limited both by the strength of needs and the costs of 
assistance (Gibney 2004: 229-261). However, the analogy with rescuing strangers does not 
work for refugees who need permanent resettlement and integration in another country.  
A humanitarian view contrasts with a normative perspective that regards asylum as a human 
right. In this latter perspective, a capacity of and commitment to protection of fundamental 
human rights is a basic condition for the legitimacy of states. States are a potential source of 
violation of these rights, but state power is also needed in order to protect individuals against 
such violation. The crucial move in establishing a duty of states to admit refugees is to regard 
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state legitimacy as not entirely a domestic matter that depends on the protection of 
fundamental rights of citizens and residents in the state territory, but also as a matter of mutual 
recognition between states as members in good standing of an international system whose 
basic norms combine sovereignty rights of states with individual human rights. In this system, 
each state is primarily responsible for protecting human rights within its own jurisdiction, but if 
some states fail to do so, then all other states acquire a collective responsibility to restore the 
damaged protection of human rights that is the main source of their own legitimacy (Carens 
2013: 196, Owen 2016). The norm of state sovereignty constrains their duties or rights to 
intervene in other human rights-violating states, but this constraint does not apply to refugees 
who are outside their state of nationality or to internally displaced persons in failed states.  
This view supports a wider conception of refugees than that of the 1951 Geneva Refugee 
Convention. A refugee is not only a “person who owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country“ (Art. 1). Under a broader definition 
a refugee is more generally “someone who requires the substitute protection of a new state 
because their fundamental human rights cannot or will not be protected by the state of 
membership or usual residence” (Gibney 2015: 452-3).1  
                                                          
1 See Shacknove (1985), Carens (2013: 199-203) and Miller (2016: 83) for similarly broad 
definitions.  
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States have a first-order duty not to create refugees. If they do not meet this duty because they 
engage themselves in persecution, because they fail to protect their populations from violence, 
famines and natural disasters, or because they lack the capacity to do so, then other states 
acquire a second-order responsibility to admit those as refugees who cannot be protected 
through external intervention or assistance (Miller 2016: 83). As Owen (2016: 275) suggests, 
admitting refugees is thus not only a humanitarian duty but a ‘legitimacy repair mechanism’ in 
the international state system. In international law nationality functions as a mechanism 
assigning primary responsibility for individuals to particular states. If this mechanism fails to 
protect, then other states become in principle responsible for providing substitute protection 
and membership ‘in loco civitatis’ (ibid., see also Price 2009).  
As this general responsibility is shared by all states, it seems natural to assume that states 
should also share the burdens of refugee protection and integration. International law fails, 
however, to specify any duty of assistance to states faced with large refugee inflows. Only two 
specific obligations of states in their relations to refugees have become enshrined in 
international law: non-refoulement towards territories where refugees’ lives or freedom would 
be threatened, which is considered a customary duty of international law binding all states, and 
admission of asylum seekers to determine their refugee status, which is a duty of states 
adhering to the Refugee Convention. 
These core principles of refugee law identify a primary responsibility of states where asylum 
seekers turn up at the border or on whose shores their boats land not to send them back into 
danger (non-refoulement) and to examine and determine their refugee status. Proximity seems 
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a  morally arbitrary criterion for distributing these responsibilities between states. But, as 
Carens and Miller explain, when confronted with an asylum claim, states become indeed 
responsible because refugees have made themselves vulnerable to their decisions, so that what 
the state decides will inevitably determine their future fate (Carens 2013: 206-7, Miller 2016: 
84).2  
The big lacuna in current refugee law concerns what happens next. State responsibility cannot 
be reduced to non-deportation and adjudication; it extends to effective protection and 
eventually integration of those who cannot return. Putting the burdens of refugee integration 
on so-called ‘frontline states’ in the vicinity of refugee generating regimes and crises is not 
merely unfair towards the former but also means that the numbers of those who are provided 
with protection will be limited by the resources of these states. 
It is easier to agree that current international norms generate an unjust distribution of refugees 
than to specify what a just distribution would look like. Should it aim primarily for justice among 
states or for justice towards refugees? The most frequently cited criterion for a just distribution 
between states is their relative capacity for refugee integration measured in terms of wealth 
and size. Each state ought to admit refugees in proportion to some indicator combining GDP 
and population numbers (Thielemann, Williams, and Boswell 2010; Carens 2013: 214-15; 
Gibney 2015: 457).  
                                                          
2 As helpfully pointed out by a reviewer, refugees are also potentially vulnerable to decisions of faraway states that 
may or may not resettle them. However, in this case the responsibility of states for the future of a particular 
refugee is still shared among a large number of potential addressees of their claims. By contrast, receiving an 
asylum claim establishes a special responsibility of a particular state.    
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Yet particular states can also have special responsibilities for refugees because of their 
involvement in the refugee generating situation, e.g. if they supported a repressive regime or a 
warring party in an armed conflict (Souter 2014, Miller 2016: 90) or because they accept a kin 
state responsibility for a persecuted diaspora, as Germany did for ethnic German expellees 
from Eastern Europe after World War II. In contrast to the ‘positional’ special duties of 
proximate states that receive disproportionate numbers of refugees, such reparative and 
identity-based special responsibilities do not diminish the shares that states have to contribute 
to a global refugee protection scheme. While the former have strong redistributive claims 
towards other states, the latter have to contribute their fair shares to global refugee protection 
on top of their special responsibilities to particular refugees.3  
Even a distribution that combines special and general duties of states in this way will, however, 
fail to approximate the goal of justice towards refugees. The reason is that refugees are not a 
global public bad similar to carbon emissions the costs for which have to be shared fairly 
between states in relation to their capacities and involvement. They are human agents with 
particular ties, needs and plans and these point them often towards particular destinations. 
Gibney argues along these lines that what is owed to refugees qua refugees is a place where 
they are “likely to flourish” (Gibney 2015: 459) and “can rebuild a meaningful social world” 
(ibid.: 460). This entails, at a minimum, that states who admit refugees must also admit their 
                                                          
3 As pointed out by a reviewer, states that have been involved in generating a refugee crisis can 
also deliver their reparative duties by supporting resettlement in neighbouring states if this is 
better in terms of refugee integration or return options.  
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family members. But it could also mean that a just distribution of refugees needs to take into 
account in which countries they are likely to be successful in rebuilding their lives because their 
skills will be valued and their ways of life will be respected. These will often be countries that 
have former colonial ties and shared languages with the refugees’ countries of origin and where 
larger numbers of immigrants or refugees from the same origin have already settled before 
(ibid.: 459). Refugees’ preferences in this regard do not constitute a right to choose a specific 
destination, but they are still morally relevant. When relocating refugees with a view towards 
their permanent settlement, preferences for certain destinations will often be based on special 
ties that are not easily measured and the exercise of choice itself can enhance the refugees’ 
commitment to integrate.   
If these criteria determine the distribution of refugees, the outcome will be much less arbitrary 
than allocating full responsibility for integration to the first safe state that asylum seekers can 
reach, but it will still be unfair towards states that do not admit any because refugees do not 
have any special ties to them.  
These considerations have two implications for a just distribution between states. First, they 
rule out several other criteria for determining capacity-based fair shares between states that 
have been occasionally considered in the literature. Second, they suggest that the optimal 
distribution will equalize the contributions of states to global refugee protection rather than 
the numbers of resettled refugees in relation to state capacities.  
Apart from wealth and population size, territory (as measured by population density) is a third 
possible criterion for a fair distribution among states. Yet contemporary refugees are not 
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colonial settlers in search for land but people in need for jobs, education, health care and other 
public services, all of which can generally be provided more efficiently in more urbanized and 
densely populated societies.  
A fourth capacity-related criterion is a country’s immigration history and policy. Prior intake of 
refugees in the preceding period and current numbers of refugees for whom the state has 
significant public expenditures should obviously be taken into account, as it would naturally be 
if an allocation formula uses appropriate time intervals. By contrast, it would be wrong to 
consider a country’s past admission of refugees over a longer period as a ground for 
discounting its current admission duties. The reason is that refugees who no longer receive 
state support because they have successfully integrated are not a burden. Even more 
problematic is the idea that accepting refugees “will take spaces away from others whom the 
state may positively wish to attract” (Miller 2016: 86-6). This empirical claim relies on what we 
may call the “fallacy of fixed integration capacity”. The fallacy lies in assuming an upper 
threshold for such capacities determined by the overall share of immigrants (including 
refugees) in the population. It is in fact more plausible to assume that accepting regular 
immigrants enhances the capacities of states to also integrate refugees instead of reducing it. 
This is because immigrants tend to create additional jobs and ethnic networks that newcomers 
can benefit from. They also transform societies more generally by making them culturally more 
diverse and thus more open to refugees of different origins (Carens 2013: 215).4  It is true that 
                                                          
4 As helpfully pointed out by a reviewer, this very transformation is often controversial and may 
be regarded as a burden on societies that want to retain a previous cultural heterogeneity. I am 
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an anti-immigrant backlash among the native population may indirectly limit the political 
capacity for refugee admission. Yet this latter phenomenon is generally not empirically 
correlated to the share of resident immigrants in the population at either local or national level. 
Hostility towards immigrants among their citizens is a reason why democratic states may fail to 
meet their moral duties, it is not a reason to think that they do not have such duties in the first 
place. Finally, scholars analyzing immigration policies comparatively have found positive 
correlations between the degree of restrictiveness or openness of policies on labour 
immigration, family reunification and asylum (Schmid and Helbling 2016). In other words, 
empirically there does not seem to be a general trade-off between admitting economic and 
family migrants, on the one hand, and refugees, on the other hand.  
Miller’s assumption of fixed integration capacities leads him to suggest that refugees should be 
included in an overall immigration quota. Although within such a quota priority ought to be 
given to refugees over other immigrants, “[a] state that has set an overall immigration target, 
on grounds that are publicly justified, can also take steps to ensure that the number of refugees 
it admits does not exceed the target” (Miller 2016: 92). Miller sees a tragic conflict where 
“there are some refugees for whom no state is willing to take responsibility: each state 
sincerely and reasonably believes it has done enough, taking into account the cost of accepting 
                                                          
going to argue below that such states can choose to contribute to global refugee protection 
through monetary transfers rather than refugee admission. This is quite different from arguing 
that a society’s anti-immigration attitudes justify reducing its contribution to global refugee 
protection. 
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refugees, to discharge its fair share of the burden” (Miller 2016: 93, see also Miller 2007: 226-
7). Yet no solidaristic scheme of sharing a given collective burden can operate on the principle 
that each participant can determine and limit her contributions unilaterally (Noll 2015). Even if 
we hypothesize that states voluntarily set the limit at a level that amounts to their fair shares, 
this level cannot be determined by their overall immigration targets with respect to which, on 
Miller’s view, states may rightly pursue their national self-interests. If a country keeps its 
immigration quota close to zero in order to preserve its relative cultural homogeneity, then this 
policy preference cannot limit its fair contribution to a scheme of burden-sharing in refugee 
admissions. Whatever criteria we take into account, fair shares must instead be determined in 
relation to the overall numbers of refugees, on the one hand, and some objective indicators for 
capacities and special duties of all states involved, on the other hand.  
If we could then work out the fair shares of all states in refugee admission and integration 
based these criteria, these still seem to conflict with the other consideration that refugees need 
not just secure residence in another state, but opportunities to build new lives. Normative 
analyses have either given priority to justice among states – often by emphasizing that refugees 
do not have rights to choose their preferred destination (Ferracioli 2014: 142, Carens 2013: 
216) – or they have set up the two considerations as a dilemma (Gibney 2015) so that we 
seemed to be forced to choose between them.  
Yet the two goals of justice towards refugees and towards states are not incompatible with 
each other. They can be reconciled if they are properly sequenced. The overall goal must be to 
provide effective protection to the largest number of refugees. In order to approximate it, we 
 13 
 
must in a first step determine the special duties of states towards refugees that are vulnerable 
to these states’ decisions. This first goal explains why duties of non-refoulement and admission 
for adjudication of asylum claims fall naturally on states in the proximity of source countries; it 
also explains why sometimes neighbouring states have to bear the brunt of the burden of 
hosting refugees who hope to be able to return and want to stay close to their country of 
origin. And it explains, finally, why countries that have already admitted higher numbers of 
refugees are often expected to take even more while others keep their borders closed. Such an 
uneven distribution of refugees may be the best we can hope for if we ask what particular 
states owe to each refugee individually. It is, however, not the best solution when asking what 
ought to be done to offer effective protection to as many refugees as possible.  
Justice between states becomes relevant as a second goal once we consider it from the 
perspective of states’ general duties towards refugees worldwide. If refugee protection is a 
legitimacy repair mechanism in the international state system, then all states ought to 
contribute in proportion to their resources. The apparent conflict between both goals can be 
avoided if states can meet their global duties by either admitting refugees or transferring 
resources to those states that face stronger burdens because of their geographic proximity or 
because they are better suited for long-term integration. If states have some choice between 
contributing through admitting refugees or subsidizing refugee admission elsewhere and if the 
price for buying out of admissions is set at the right level, then many states will rationally 
choose to offer more slots to refugees rather than pay into the system, for example if they have 
demographic and labour market needs for immigration that turn refugees in the long run from 
a burden into an asset (Noll 2003: 237). Refugees, on the other hand, will be rationally 
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motivated to settle in a country that has chosen to accept them for such reasons rather than in 
states that would prefer to pay to keep them out.  
What I have tried so far is to work out principles for a distribution of refugees under the 
assumption that states are generally committed to justice for refugees. Any theory of justice for 
refugees falls necessarily within the domain of what John Rawls has identified as non-ideal 
theory. In a just world, there would be no refugees, since all states would refrain from 
persecution and would have sufficient resources and be committed to protecting the 
fundamental human rights of their inhabitants. Within non-ideal theory, we need to distinguish 
different levels of idealization. The argument until now has aimed at the highest possible level. I 
have disagreed with authors who claim that ideally all states ought to agree on admitting 
shares of the global refugee population that are proportional to their wealth and size, because 
this principle fails to recognize special responsibilities of states for particular refugees and 
special links of refugees to particular states. I have then restated the general principle as one of 
proportional contribution of each state to the global protection of those refugees for whom 
states do not carry a particular responsibility. If some states choose to contribute by 
transferring resources that will enable other states to integrate more refugees and to integrate 
them better than they could have been under a principle of proportional distribution of 
refugees, then the former system does better in achieving justice for refugees than the latter. 
We now need to climb down the ladder of idealization in order to approximate better real 
world conditions for refugee protection. The first assumption we need to introduce is that is 
even states that are ready to comply and cooperate in a global system of refugee protection 
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will be detracted from the goal of justice for refugees by self-interest and prejudice. For this 
reason, such a system requires common global standards in the determination of refugee status 
and a global authority that works out an initial determination of refugee quota per country 
(with the special responsibility modifications discussed above) and that regulates and monitors 
financial transfers between states. A serious objection to quota trading is that the criteria used 
by states to select refugees may be discriminatory so that certain refugees have a much lower 
chance to be accepted in their preferred destination on grounds of their religion, skin colour or 
sexual orientiation. In a collaborative scheme, such negative selection would also produce a 
stigmatizing effect by marking some groups as particularly unwanted, which would impact on 
their chance to find adequate protection anywhere. In principle, it should be possible to avoid 
such effects in a well-designed scheme that imposes non-discrimination constraints on states’ 
preferences.  Secondly, the use of transfer payments to states hosting refugees would have to 
be monitored to make sure that the money is actually used for refugee integration instead of 
keeping them forever in refugee camps or even deporting them secretly (Gerver 2013).  
A number of authors have proposed and discussed various refugee quota trading schemes that 
aim at optimizing refugee protection among states that are willing to subscribe to this goal 
while curbing perverse incentives for abuse (Schuck 1997; Hathaway and Neve 1997; Betts 
2003; Thielemann 2003). The very idea of trading refugee quota has been criticized by others as 
a “commodification” of refugees (Anker, Fitzpatrick, and Shacknove 1998; Sandel 2012: 63-64).5  
Yet this does not seem an appropriate description for making states pay if they are less willing 
                                                          
5 See the discussion in Miller (2016: 88-9). 
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than others to host refugees and rewarding those that are willing to take more. Mollie Gerver 
objects to the trading of refugee quota on a different ground. For her, it is immoral to reward 
states for doing what they are anyhow required to do (Gerver 2013: 72-73). This critique is 
question-begging since it assumes what needs to be argued for: that states’ refugee admission 
duties cannot be substituted by financial contributions that will improve overall protection. 
Proposals for quota trading schemes have also been criticized for potentially undermining 
states’ adherence to duties of non-refoulement and refugee admission under the Refugee 
Convention (Smith 2004). It is important to remember, however, that burden-sharing schemes 
are justifiable only as corrective mechanisms; they address the initially unfair distribution of 
refugee integration burdens resulting from the implementation of present international legal 
norms without replacing the primary state duties enshrined in these norms. Non-refoulement 
and asylum determination duties are not weakened by relocating refugees for permanent 
settlement after their legal status has been determined.   
The schemes for trading refugee quota initially proposed by Schuck, Hathaway and Neve suffer, 
however, from one major flaw: they ignore refugees’ preferences for certain destinations that 
are, as I have argued above, morally relevant in order to meet Gibney’s goal of doing justice to 
refugees qua refugees instead of regarding them merely as a burden that ought to be 
distributed fairly among states. Economists have proposed a scheme that complements 
tradeable admission quotas with a scheme for matching preferences of refugees for certain 
destinations and preferences of states for certain refugees. As long as discriminatory state 
preferences can be ruled out, such a scheme could be the best practical way how to 
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approximate the twin goals of justice for refugees and justice between states (Fernández-
Huertas Moraga and Rapoport 2014).  
In order to say something that is relevant for refugee protection in the real world, we still need 
to climb down one more rung on the ladder of idealization. If responsibility for refugee 
protection could be shared globally it would be spread out widely and thinly among those 
states that do not themselves generate refugees with only insignificant burdens to each. Many 
of these states are, however, unwilling to cooperate in a global refugee protection scheme. 
Some states do not see any benefit in such a scheme if they believe they can seal off their 
borders against spontaneous inflows. “Treating refugees justly serves relatively few state 
interests” (Carens 2013: 221). Others perceive refugee protection more optimistically as a 
global public good, but this conjures up a collective action dilemma since all states have 
incentives to freeride on the contributions of others (Noll 2003, Thielemann 2003, Gerver 
2013). Various ways of mitigating this dilemma have been proposed, such as conceiving of 
refugee protection as a ‘joint-production model’ in which states benefit in proportion to their 
contribution (Betts 2003) or as an iterated game in which states develop rational long-term 
interests in cooperation. But it remains plainly true that in the current international state 
system, a scheme for fair contributions of states to international refugee protection could only 
work among a union of states with voluntary membership6 and sufficient integration to ensure 
compliance. I will discuss below whether these conditions hold in the European Union. Before 
                                                          
6 As acknowledged by Schuck (1997). 
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doing so, we need to consider what moral duties states have under conditions of widespread 
non-compliance.  
Under such conditions, a principle that every state needs to contribute a globally fair share only 
if there are credible assurances that all other states will do so likewise is unworkable. A theory 
that makes refugee protection conditional upon strongly idealized conditions of compliance, 
fails in its core task to specify duties in the context of actual refugee emergencies in the real 
world. Instead, individual states must have third-order duties (in addition to their first-order 
duty to protect human rights in their own jurisdiction and their second-order duties to take in a 
globally fair share of refugees) to step in for others who fail to do their bit. Owen concludes 
that in a world in which rogue states, burdened regimes and selfish states are present, those 
states that adhere to the norms of refugee protection have to take in more than they would be 
obliged to if all states fully complied with their second-order duties (Owen 2016: 286).  
Does this view entail that the legitimacy of every state depends on its readiness to act alone in 
admitting refugees even if all other states turn them away? The notion that our state cannot be 
obliged to take in all the refugees of the world is a well-known rhetorical trope employed by 
politicians everywhere when arguing for restrictions. It can be easily debunked by pointing out 
that such a duty cannot arise if a sufficient number of states comply with much lighter duties of 
burden-sharing amongst themselves. Those governments that rhetorically preempt the non-
compliance of other states are usually the very same that oppose international efforts of 
cooperation. The extreme scenario where only one single refugee admitting country carries 
alone the global burden is anyhow ruled out by a state legitimacy account. Since state 
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legitimacy is generated through mutual recognition, in order to apply the third-order duty of 
stepping in where other states fail to comply there must be at least a group of states that 
mutually acknowledge that they share the responsibility that other states have shunned. In 
other words, Miller’s tragic conflict where no state can be held responsible for admitting 
additional refugees can arise only in a situation where this group is too small and the numbers 
of refugees too large in relation to their capacities. In such a scenario, the international 
legitimacy of states grounded in mutual recognition paired with respect for human rights would 
already have been seriously impaired by both the refugee generating states and all the other 
states that fail to comply with their refugee protection duties. Refugee protection would 
remain a humanitarian duty of individual states but could no longer be regarded as a human 
right backed by international law.  
This is the conclusion to draw for international duties to admit refugees. Each state has 
obligations of non-refoulement and admission for the purpose of determining refugee status 
towards those who seek asylum in its territory and a duty to cooperate in a redistribution of 
resources and refugees across states, with fair shares being determined by resource-based 
capacities, on the one hand, and particular responsibilities and links between individual 
refugees and states, on the other hand. In the absence of global enforcement mechanisms, 
each state also has a duty to contribute to building the largest feasible ‘coalition of the willing’ 
by strengthening the mandate of international organisations, such as the UNHCR, and by 
committing to contribute its fair share of resources and refugee intake within such a coalition in 
pursuit of the goal to maximize the number of global refugees whose human rights are 
effectively protected.  
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As Zofia Stemplowska has argued, the moral duty to ‘take up the slack’ if others fail to do their 
fair share can be legitimately enforced if the beneficiaries are in dire need and assistance can 
be provided at reasonable cost (Stemplowska 2016). In the international state system there is, 
however, an enforcement dilemma: Any attempt to set up enforcement mechanisms will deter 
states from joining a coalition of the willing that is ready to step in where other states shirk 
their duties to contribute to global refugee protection.   
(Miller 2013: 206-27)  
3. Does European integration facilitate or prevent burden-sharing? 
By contrast, in the EU context refugee protection becomes a collective action problem for a 
predefined set of member states. This should facilitate a just solution that aligns with shared 
interests. However, since the collective action problem is of a prisoners’ dilemma type, game 
theory predicts a suboptimal outcome for all players if they do not succeed in coordinating their 
actions (Noll 2003).   
One might expect that European integration and the commitments that member states have 
made towards each other should provide a nearly ideal context for resolving the problem of 
burden-sharing in refugee protection. States that are ready to comply with their duties do not 
have to look around who else might be ready to do so. First, they are already part of a 
permanent coalition whose members have subscribed to a principle of sincere cooperation with 
regard to the tasks spelled out in the Treaty on European Union (TEU Art. 4.3) and a principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities, including its financial implications, between the 
member states in matters of border checks, migration and asylum (TFEU Art. 80). Already the 
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1999 Tampere Council conclusions invoked solidarity in building a Common European Asylum 
System.7  Council Directive 2001/55/EC (Temporary Protection Directive) committed member 
states to a collective response in case of considerable flows of asylum seekers. Second, they 
participate jointly and equally in supranational executive, legislative and judicial institutions 
endowed with significant power, which greatly facilitates the task of coordinating efforts to 
build a fair scheme of burden-sharing. Third, they are geographic neighbours in a regional union 
that includes multiple alternative destinations for refugees from the same origin travelling on 
the same routes so that it seems natural to regard the EU as being jointly responsible for 
refugees in its vicinity instead of assigning this task to individual states of first EU entry. Fourth, 
one of the more advanced areas of cooperation in the EU is with regard to external border 
control of the Schengen area, where there is an EU wide system of data exchange (the 
Schengen Information System) and an EU agency (FRONTEX) charged not only with 
coordination tasks but also operational ones, including rescue at sea and return of irregular 
migrants. Asylum seekers who turn up at the external borders make themselves therefore not 
merely vulnerable to decisions by the state of arrival, but also by the EU at large and all its 
member states. It seems therefore obvious that these states share a duty of cooperation with 
regard to refugee admission.  
Why has it then been so difficult to translate this duty into institutional rules? There are at least 
three reasons. The first is that the member states agreed already in the 1990s on a principle of 
assigning responsibility for asylum determination to the EU state of first entry without adding 
                                                          
7 Tampere European Council 15-16 October 1999. Presidency conclusions  
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to it the necessary complement of a burden-sharing mechanism. Once it had been entrenched 
in EU law through the Dublin Convention and now the Dublin III Regulation, the Dublin 
principles were difficult to modify because of the vested interests of a majority of states whom 
they relieved from the burden of admitting asylum seekers who had already passed through 
another member state. Dublin has been challenged by decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights that found conditions for hosting asylum seekers and processing their 
applications in some member states below European human rights standards and prohibited 
forced returns to Greece or Italy.8 Yet such judicial constraints did not challenge the basic logic 
of the system. Instead they added blame to the burdens of frontline states by requiring that 
they invest more resources into their asylum systems so that they comply with European 
standards, no matter how many refugees these countries have to deal with. The indirect 
redistribution of asylum seekers to other states who could not be returned to the EU state of 
first entry did therefore not establish an alternative burden-sharing mechanism designed to 
relieve the latter. 
The second reason is the lack of shared norms with regard to asylum procedures and the 
recognition of refugees (Noll 2015). In spite of three relevant directives,9 asylum seekers face 
very unequal opportunities in terms of reception, public assistance, and the probability of 
                                                          
8 M.S.S. v. BELGIUM AND GREECE (Application no. 30696/09), judgment of 11 January 2011; 
TARAKHEL v. SWITZERLAND (Application no. 29217/12), judgment of 4 November 2014. 
9 Qualifications Directive 2011/95/EU; Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU; Reception 
Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU. 
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gaining protection status. Even for Syrians, who in 2015 had an average recognition rate as 
refugees of 95% in the EU, this rate dropped to 50% in Estonia and 43% in Slovakia (European 
Stability Initiative 2015). Hungary’s overall rate of recognition of Convention refugees fell from 
merely 5% in 2014 to 0.1% in 2015 (Eurostat 2016).10 Unequal standards are problematic not 
merely because they provide incentives for asylum seekers to choose a destination country 
because of its high recognition rates rather than its capacity to integrate them well, but also 
because they undermine solidaristic relocation schemes. A country with restrictive standards 
will not be ready to accept transfers of refugees from a more generous one if it would have 
rejected these had they claimed asylum in its territory.  
The third reason is the Schengen principle of open internal borders. States of first entry at the 
external Schengen border lacked both capacities and incentives to fully implement the Dublin 
Regulation and were thus interested in letting asylum seekers move onwards towards other 
destinations. Non-EU states on these routes, such as Macedonia and Serbia, did not block these 
movements knowing that they would be only states of transit. And the main EU destination 
states of Sweden, Germany and Austria do not have any external Schengen borders where they 
could have controlled inflows. This combination of open internal borders with external borders 
that states lacked incentives to control produced the massive migration of refugees via the 
Balkan route to their desired destinations in summer 2015. It was in this context that German 
chancellor Merkel decided in August 2015 to unilaterally suspend the implementation of the 
                                                          
10 Eurostat press release 20 April 2016, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7233417/3-20042016-AP-EN.pdf/ 
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Dublin Regulation. This step was partly an acknowledgement of the practical impossibility of 
returning many thousands of asylum seekers to their first country of entry. It was also a 
recognition of an outpouring of spontaneous assistance for refugees in civil society dubbed as 
“Willkommenskultur” (culture of welcome). Finally, one may guess that the German chancellor 
also acted in order to set an example and put pressure on the other EU member states to agree 
to a more ambitious relocation plan, which was duly adopted by the EU Council in September. 
In this plan the member states committed to relocate 160,000 persons from countries of first 
entry to other member states over the course of two years.  
The plan has not worked out. In its progress report of November 2016, the Commission 
reported a total number of 6,925 persons relocated since October 2015 (5,376 from Greece and 
1,549 from Italy), far short of the planned 6,000 relocations per month (European Commission 
2016). Instead of committing to burden-sharing through relocation, the transit and destination 
states on the refugee routes started to control and physically close internal Schengen borders 
by establishing checkpoints and building border fences. Controls at these previously open 
borders have had significant side-effects for EU citizens who commute across them on a daily 
basis. And the crisis became an institutional one when the decision to top up the relocation 
numbers from 40,000 to 160,000 was adopted in the European Council in September 2015 by 
qualified majority against the votes of the Višegrad group of states (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia) whose governments subsequently announced that they did not intend 
to comply. In October 2016, the Hungarian government even held a referendum (that failed 
because of low turnout) asking voters to reject the EU plan for relocation. What saved the EU 
from complete failure and full-blown institutional crisis was the so-called EU-Turkey Statement 
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of 18 March 2016 that led to a substantial reduction of new arrivals from that country. Given 
the increasing strains in EU-Turkey relations due to the authoritarian turn of the Ankara 
government, the future prospects of this agreement are rather uncertain.  
What lessons can be drawn from the failure of the EU to realize its institutional potential for an 
effective burden-sharing scheme in refugee admission? First, and most importantly, such a 
scheme cannot get off the ground as long as the states involved maintain the rule that first 
countries of entry carry full responsibility for admitting asylum seekers, processing their 
applications, deporting the rejected ones and hosting permanently those who gain a protected 
status. In the European Union the common control of external borders and open internal ones 
imply that asylum seekers do not only enter Greece or Italy but also EU territory. There are thus 
two layers of national and supranational responsibility as soon as an asylum seeker steps 
ashore or crosses an external land border. The Dublin principle of assigning responsibility 
exclusively to the first safe EU country should not only have been temporarily suspended but 
renegotiated and replaced with a multilayered functional division of responsibilities.  
Second, as explained in section 2 above, the sharing of norms is an indispensable pre-condition 
for cooperative games of burden-sharing (Noll 2003). There are no good reasons why people 
escaping from the same context of origin have different opportunities of receiving recognition 
and protection in different states. In an international context, it will remain a sovereign 
prerogative of states to interpret and apply the norms of international refugee law. In the EU 
context, however, member states have already agreed to norm sharing through a set of EU 
directives but remain locked into negative competition between alternative destinations, which 
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creates an incentive for each state to tighten its own admission standards in order to divert 
asylum seekers to states with less restrictive ones. This reason for uniformity with regard to the 
award of legal status need not apply in the same way to standards for integration regarding 
accommodation, training and social assistance for asylum seekers, since these depend more 
strongly on state capacities and comparable social provisions for local populations. In such 
respects, baseline standards, such as a limits on the time for which asylum seekers can be 
excluded from access to employment rather than uniformity are called for.  
Third, the principles for a relocation scheme need to be fundamentally rethought. The one 
currently pursued by the EU relies on a “mandatory distribution key using objective and 
quantifiable criteria (40% of the size of the population, 40% of the GDP, 10% of the average 
number of past asylum applications, 10% of the unemployment rate)” and prospects of 
recognition (nationalities with an EU average recognition rate of 75% or more) (European 
Commission 2015). Such a scheme is unworkable for relocations on a grand scale if it is 
insensitive to the particular links between refugees and destination states discussed in section 
2.  
I have endorsed there relocation schemes that aim to match preferences of refugees and 
states. The general arguments for such a scheme become stronger in the EU context. First, 
relocating refugees to countries where they are unwilling to go and that are unwilling to have 
them comes at very high political cost in terms of democratic support in the host country. In the 
EU, such a scheme is additionally bound to undermine general support for EU integration since 
governments that are forced to comply can divert blame by fueling resentment against the EU 
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institutions. Second, such a relocation scheme is likely to be ineffective in a European context 
where refugees, once they have gained protection status, can relocate themselves through 
secondary migration to a preferred destination.  
Should a solidaristic relocation scheme also take into account the preferences of host states? It 
would be self-defeating to let countries that are part of a European scheme simply opt out and 
impose thereby additional burdens on the other states. Yet governments and citizens of some 
countries may strongly prefer to contribute financially rather than through accepting relocated 
refugees. As long as such countries accept their duties to keep borders open for asylum seekers 
– who can be subsequently be relocated within the scheme – and to admit permanents 
refugees with particular ties, they should be allowed to trade off their admission duties against 
financial support for other countries that are willing to host refugees. The price they pay per 
refugee whom they do not want to admit should not be fixed, but ought to reflect the cost their 
exclusionary preference imposes on the other states (Rapoport and Fernández-Huertas Moraga 
2014). By contrast, the EU’s current location scheme foresees a payment of EUR 6,000.- from 
the EU budget to destination states per refugee relocated from Greece and Italy.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has endorsed David Owen’s view that refugee protection is not merely a 
humanitarian duty but a ‘legitimacy repair mechanism’ in international relations. I have 
interpreted this view as entailing a second-order duty of states to cooperate with other states 
in such a way that a maximum number of refugees can receive effective protection. I have tried 
to resolve an apparent conflict between justice for refugees and justice in burden-sharing 
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between states by arguing that an unequal distribution of refugees across states participating in 
a burden-sharing scheme is justified insofar as it enhances the capacity of the scheme to meet 
the goal of effective protection for the largest number of refugees. This can be achieved if 
states that end up with relatively smaller shares contribute to refugee integration in other 
states in proportion to the costs that the lower intakes in the former generates for the latter.  
In the international arena burden-sharing requires a coalition of the willing that is unlikely to 
come about because of the incentives for states to freeride on others’ contributions to global 
refugee protection. The EU as a regional union of states with relatively powerful institutions of 
supranational government is in a nearly optimal position to establish an effective regime of 
burden-sharing involving all its member states. Yet when put to the test in summer 2015, the 
EU failed. The states of first entry and final destination had to carry hugely disproportionate 
and uncompensated burdens. This is partly due to the incomplete prior harmonization of norms 
regarding reception and determination of asylum status across member states. Even more 
important is the clash between the Dublin Regulation’s assignment of responsibility to the EU 
state of first entry and open borders in the Schengen area. The result has been a perceived 
breakdown of public order through uncontrolled movements of refugees towards their 
preferred destination and widespread defection of member states from the agreed refugee 
relocation scheme as well as from the Schengen principles. 
When exposed to the external shock of the 2015 surge in refugee numbers, the latent 
contradictions between incompletely Europeanized asylum standards, the Dublin principles and 
open internal Schengen borders have become manifest. The impact of the refugee crisis on 
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trust in European institutions and their capacity to ensure member state compliance is 
potentially devastating. Yet the strongest costs are born by the refugees themselves and they 
can be measured in the numbers of recorded deaths and missing migrants on the route to 
Europe.11 
                                                          
11 IOM reported 5,083 deaths in the Mediterranean Sea in 2016, up from 3,777 in 2015 and 
3,279 in 2014 (IOM 2017). The relatively stable numbers in 2014 and 2015 in spite of the 
dramatic increase of arrivals in Europe in 2015, and the stark rise of recorded deaths in 2016 
seem to be mainly due to the effective closure of the less dangerous route via Greek islands and 
the Balkans and the resurgence of much more risky crossings from Libya to Italy in 2016.  
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